There is Substantial Evidence that Michael Crooks’ Client, Robert Krenz, Committed Perjury on Behalf of the Dane County DA’s Office
1. Pursuant to a court order, an expert summary was submitted in the name of Robert Krenz. (Attachment #23). What is significant in this summary is what was underlined for emphasis, i.e. that Krenz “will testify that it does not appear that the driver of the Raisbeck vehicle locked the brakes prior to leaving the road.”
2. The emphasized language in this expert summary would be subsequently proven to be categorically false. This led to the question of who was responsible for the expert summary. Humphrey testified under oath that Krenz drafted it. Krenz testified under oath that he did not, and that it was his assumption that it was Humphrey. (Attachment #24, Attachment #25)
3. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 7, 2003. On Humphrey’s behalf, Krenz testified to the validity of the summary. Krenz also testified in specific that “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, there was no evidence of locking of brakes.” Krenz also testified in specific that when it came to braking, he “could define that it was not locked wheel.” (Attachment #26)
4. Following Krenz’s testimony, an issue arose in regard to the photographic evidence appearing to definitively show that the brakes had been locked before Raisbeck’s vehicle left the roadway. The question arose, were both the expert summary and Krenz’s testimony fraudulent? To head off testimony, DA Brian Blanchard submitted an affidavit from Robert Krenz in which Krenz referenced email communications between Humphrey and himself. (Attachment #27, page 2 of Krenz’s affidavit).
5. Krenz’s affidavit produced a concession. In his final paragraph, Krenz asserted under oath as follows:
“be advised that when looking at photographs from the scene, I note that the black marks in the final feet before the car leaves the roadway suggest braking. I note two lines in close parallel that suggest marks made by a set of treads in a manner consistent with locked wheel (or near locked wheel) braking in those final feet. However, this observation does not alter my energy analysis or my opinion of the vehicle speed.”
(Attachment #28, page 3 of Krenz’s affidavit).
6. DA Brian Blanchard was the individual personally responsible for the withholding of the emails Krenz referenced in his affidavit. For almost one year the DA’s Office refused to provide the emails. When the emails were provided, then-sitting Judge Robert Pekowsky was informed that the emails contained a bombshell and substantiated serious misconduct, and falsifying of expert analysis. Judge Pekowsky refused to address the issue, even going so far as to refuse to permit the emails to be read into the record. (See Attachment #29)
Judge Pekowsky would never address the issue. When under oath he could not provide a reason.
7. Judge Daniel Moeser succeeded Judge Pekowsky as the judge in Raisbeck, due to (in his own words) “volunteering.” Judge Moeser’s son was an assistant Dane County District Attorney whose immediate superiors in the Dane County DA’s Office were the then-prosecutors on Raisbeck, i.e. DDA Timothy Verhoff and DDA Judy Schwaemle. Judge Moeser did not see a conflict, or even the appearance of a conflict.
8. On October 21, 2004, Judge Moeser ruled that the emails between Krenz and ADA Paul Humphrey substantiated that Humphrey had misrepresented Krenz’s true opinion on the issue of braking, and that the withheld emails were withheld exculpatory evidence. Judge Moeser further ruled that this discovery violation was so serious that it justified prohibiting Krenz as a witness in Raisbeck. (See Attachment #30, Wisconsin State Journal and Capital Times articles of 10/22/2004).
9. However, Judge Moeser would twist his ruling a couple of months later to where his ruling would now be beneficial to the Dane County DA’s office, and highly detrimental to Raisbeck. Judge Moeser would rule that the Dane County DA’s office would be able to replace Krenz with a second expert, i.e. Dennis Skogen, and he would likewise prohibit the defense from going into why Krenz had been removed. Judge Moeser had no concern for the financial impact his decision would have on Raisbeck.
10. Krenz would later be deposed, with Judge Moeser ruling that most of his testimony would be impermissible for the jury to hear. When deposed, Krenz would concede that the photo evidence showed to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that Raisbeck’s brakes had been applied, and that this absolutely voided Dep. Gnacinski’s expert analysis (the evidence utilized by Humphrey to have Raisbeck bound over for trial). Krenz also testified that he had been retained by Humphrey as of February 2, 2002, and that he told Humphrey of the above in February of 2002. (Raisbeck was bound over for trial on February 15, 2002. Humphrey would never even infer that Krenz told Humphrey that Gnacinski’s analysis was invalid until May 12, 2003). (See Attachment #31, Krenz’s testimony, pgs.12, 13, 53-55, 131-132; Attachment #32, Humphrey’s letter on Krenz and Gnacinski).
11. Humphrey represented for months that Krenz’s and Gnacinski’s analyses were compatible and this was the prime significance of the summary done in Krenz’s name.
12. As aforementioned, Judge Moeser refused to permit the jury to hear any of the above relating to the DA’s office and the manipulation of evidence. The Supreme Court’s in-house law firm, as will be shown, would act to ensure that no investigation into whether the Dane County DA’s Office suborned perjury from Robert Krenz would ever take place.
13. Something most remarkable is that neither Chief Justice Abrahamson’s opinion nor Justice Prosser’s dissent ever make the slightest mention of Judge Moeser’s finding that Humphrey had falsely represented Krenz’s opinion on the braking.
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